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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 36 NUMBER 23

The Coming German Elections

by George N. Shuster

When German voters go to the polls this fall they will record their answers to several significant questions. Through their choice of parties they may also indirectly express opinions on certain other issues.

The major questions are these: How do the probable successors to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer within his own party compare with the as yet untried but more vocal and possibly more independent spokesmen for the Socialist opposition? To what extent can the smaller parties, which may well determine the character of a coalition government to come, increase their strength and influence?

The first query would not arise were the chancellor as "young" and vigorous as he was in 1953, when his Christian Democrats (CDU-CSU) won an absolute majority. Now Germans are uneasily aware of Dr. Adenauer's age, particularly since the president of the Republic is a man of venerable years. Partly because the chancellor has exercised stern personal control, even such unusually effective Christian Democrats as the ministers of economics, foreign affairs, finance and defense are known to the public as specialists rather than as potential statesmen. The death in 1955 of

Dr. Hermann Ehlers, president of the Bundestag, removed the favored successor.

On the other hand, the principal Social Democratic opponents seem good organization men rather than dynamic personalities. Erich Ollenhauer, chairman of the Social Democratic party (SPD), has proved his integrity and skill but kindles no great enthusiasm. His most brilliant confederate, Carlo Schmid, is one of the ablest men on the political scene but is a "party man" only in the loosest sense.

The second question concerns primarily the Free Democrats (FDP), the German party (DP), and the All-German bloc (GB-BHE). The first two are the ones to watch. The Free Democrats, forming a restless alliance between some northern industrialists and the "liberals" of the southwest, will campaign on a platform emphasizing free enterprise and a special kind of anticlericalism. If they can persuade voters that the churches wield undue influence on German political life they may hold a balance of power, which they would probably use to favor the Social Democrats provided these dropped all nationalization schemes. The German party, which has its principal following

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in northwest Germany, is conservative though anti-Fascist. It stresses the values and traditions of the peasantry, the self-employed middle class and the soldier. It will throw its support to the chancellor's party. The All-German bloc is especially concerned with the problem of German expellees from Eastern Europe and may well continue to decline in strength. What happens to these parties may well determine whether Germany is to have a two-party system.

Now for the issues. Since Marxism has virtually ceased to be an ideological influence in the Republic, and since even the labor unions have been weakened by new forms of cooperation between workers and management, such matters as the nationalization of resources and industries are seldom as much as referred to. The level of prosperity continues to benefit all strata of the population, and a recent reduction of the work week also proves that the country has not been ruled by a rightist clique. Inflationary price trends have aroused grave concern, but the average German knows that in this respect he is better off than are most other Europeans.

Therefore, it is foreign policy and its results which the campaigners will stress, although the debate will primarily be between stark reality and wishful thinking. The grim fact that the Iron Curtain seals off enslaved millions no German can forget. Refugees still cross in unending processions, bringing accounts of bondage and injustice. The solidarity

of German labor despite the Iron Curtain is impressive. It is accordingly argued that by tying the Federal Republic too tightly to United States policy, the chancellor has sacrificed the flexibility needed to negotiate a change in Soviet attitudes toward reunification. The Social Democrats have avoided being too specific about what they would do if given a chance, but are building a case on the chancellor's failure with considerable skill.

Following the U.S.

One result of following American leadership has been the military conscription law. This has not proved as unpopular as was once confidently predicted, but the Social Democrats still contend that Germany's contribution to NATO should be a force of professional soldiers. Civilian co-operation with the West has likewise encountered snags. But here the two opposing parties maneuver adroitly. The Social Democrats have ceased to oppose the Coal and Steel Community and have greatly tempered their criticism of other forms of common European economic action. And for his part, the chancellor has skillfully avoided being induced to lend any kind of support for France's war in Algeria—a conflict of which German liberal opinion strongly disapproves and which is now the principal barrier to cordial Franco-German co-operation. All this does not spell defeat for the chancellor, but it is true that because of slowly increasing disillusionment with the idea of European union, long a major part of his

program, it will no longer attract enthusiastic support.

Thus the issues emerge as topics for discussion rather than as clear-cut alternatives of practical policy. They will be formulated on the basis of what the German citizen wishes he had, rather than what he will in all probability get. But wishes are often fathers to votes as well as thoughts. A great deal will depend on developments in international policy. The Hungarian uprising strengthened German endorsement of the chancellor's realism. Now a strong Russian contribution to the task of bringing about a measure of disarmament would probably help the Social Democrats.

Public opinion polling has become an established pastime in Germany, too. So far it has been inconclusive. Indications are that the CDU-CSU and the SPD can each count on the support of between 30 percent and 40 percent of the voters. The figures vary from time to time but remain within these limits. About 20 percent of the electorate seems to have remained noncommittal. It appears unlikely that the minor parties will attract more than a tenth of the total vote, but they may in the end do better. Both major contenders are well-organized and ready for battle. It is noteworthy that as the weeks pass, nobody will say a word in which even the sharpest ear will detect an echo of Adolf Hitler.

Dr. Shuster is president of Hunter College, New York City, the author of several books on Germany and was deputy in Bavaria to High Commissioner John J. McCloy in 1950-51.

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The Purge of Soviet Leaders

The recent political upheaval in the Kremlin raises more questions than it answers. Even the most astute students of the Soviet Union in the government and outside can only speculate as to its final outcome. But there are certain things that they can say with confidence and considerable assurance, even before this latest purge has run its course.

One thing that the triumph of Nikita S. Khrushchev over his Presidium colleagues (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov) makes obvious is that collective leadership in the U.S.S.R. is wearing thin. It may still be possible for Presidium members to differ among themselves without heads rolling. But the recent purge of four top Soviet leaders would suggest that intraparty criticism has definite and ever narrowing limits.

Khrushchev may not yet emerge from this latest upheaval as undisputed leader and successor to Stalin, but he has definitely enhanced his position and authority and is on the way to becoming Stalin's heir and the Kremlin's only voice—however much he may denounce the "cult of personality." All of Russian history, be it Tsarist or Communist, cries of autocracy and dictation; and this brief interlude of "collective leadership" suggests less a move toward representative government than the lull before another exhibition and another form of dictatorship and autocracy.

Another thing that Khrushchev's recent maneuverings suggest is that the army is in fact the real arbiter of the present political feuds within the Politburo. There is every reason to believe that Khrushchev moved against what he calls the "antiparty

group" only after he had made sure of army support. It is no secret that the army has welcomed the move away from "Stalinism," which to it denoted secret police control over the armed forces. And the elevation of Defense Minister Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov to full membership on the ruling Presidium was a logical reward for army backing of the Khrushchev coup. It can be of considerable importance that the army, for the first time in Soviet history, is now represented in the top council of the party.

A third conclusion that it seems fair to reach is that Khrushchev's drive to decentralize Soviet economy will go on as planned. It is no secret that his revolutionary program aroused fierce opposition from many of his colleagues, including the purged, not only because it would have loosened Moscow's control of the economy but would have exiled thousands of top party members and influential Soviet leaders to the hinterland.

Effect On Foreign Policy

What this last Soviet purge means internationally is less obvious. In world affairs Khrushchev has played it both hot and cold. He has made great efforts to win friends abroad, to win neutral countries to the Soviet bloc, to make up to Yugoslavia, to permit "different roads to socialism." But he has not hesitated to crack down on Hungary, to threaten Polish stirrings of liberalism, to warn Eastern European satellites of Titoism. He has talked much of "peaceful co-existence" with the West, and on his TV appearance over an American network "purred like a cat," to pur-

loin one commentator's description.

Khrushchev has denounced Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov for their attitudes toward *rapprochement* with the West, suggesting that with their purge there would be greater contact and even agreement with the West. But there is no sign that Soviet positions on German reunification, on disarmament, on satellite freedom, have shifted or will change. The so-called "Stalinist clique" in the Presidium may have been eliminated, but basic Soviet ambitions and goals have not changed. There is nothing to suggest that Khrushchev and Zhukov are not as fiercely devoted to Soviet Russia and its vital interests as were the deposed leaders. Also there is nothing to indicate that they are not as dedicated to hanging on to the present Soviet empire in Eastern Europe as was Stalin or Khrushchev's four ex-colleagues on the Presidium.

While the West may be justified in feeling a certain satisfaction in the defeat of the "Stalinist clique" in the Presidium, that should not blind it to the basic and profound differences that still exist between Moscow and the West. It may be easier to discuss things with Moscow now that the Stalinists are out; but that does not mean that Soviet positions are any less intransigent. As the State Department said when commenting on the Soviet upheaval: "The proof of the pudding is in the eating." Khrushchev may be able to bake a better smelling pudding now that he is the only cook in the Kremlin kitchen; but there is nothing yet to suggest that the pudding's ingredients have changed.

NEAL STANFORD



Should U.S. Participate in OTC?

by Philip Cortney

Mr. Cortney is chairman of the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, Inc.

TWO and one-half years ago President Eisenhower first asked Congress to authorize United States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC). This followed a key recommendation of the Randall Commission, which said that "the organizational provisions" of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) should be renegotiated to provide for a permanent organization to administer GATT.

The President has repeated this request frequently and in the strongest terms. On June 14, 1957 he said, "It seems to me almost ridiculous that we do not promptly join this organization [OTC] in order that there may be an administrative group to make certain of the protection of our own rights as we try to advance the whole theory of better world trade all around the globe."

Last year the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives held two weeks of hearings on the OTC bill which covered every possible aspect of the question. The committee then voted 17 to 7 in favor of the bill. The report prepared by the committee is a masterly analysis of the advantages which the United States will obtain from joining OTC. It also analyzed with painstaking care the objections to this bill. These objections, including the charge that GATT and OTC are unconstitutional and that membership in OTC would damage some American industries, were found to be groundless. For lack of vocal public support at the time, the bill was not acted upon. In the present Congress a substantially identical bill, H.R.

6630, has been introduced and is awaiting action.

At stake in the struggle over United States membership in the OTC is the continued vitality of GATT and the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Program itself. In economic terms America now nearly equals in size all other free nations combined. Without active United States leadership there can be no OTC, and GATT will disintegrate.

GATT's Record

Since 1934 the United States has increasingly recognized the necessity of cooperation to insure that international trade, the largest economic link between nations, promotes the strength and cohesion of friendly nations rather than divides them as was true during the period between the two world wars. After experimenting for several years with bilateral trade negotiations the United States found that its own interests required that these negotiations be carried on with many nations simultaneously. As a result, the United States took the lead in negotiating GATT in 1947. Our negotiators acted under the authority granted to the President by the Congress in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Since the United States first signed GATT the Congress has extended the Trade Agreements Act six times. On each occasion the Congress, if it had wished, could have directed the President to withdraw from GATT.

In nine years of operation GATT has demonstrated its value. The participating nations, which together account for four-fifths of world trade,

have reduced or frozen over 50,000 tariffs. Many of these actions have been of direct benefit to United States exports. GATT is at least partially responsible for the fact that world trade is much larger in real terms today than ever before in history. International trade now provides more jobs in the United States than the textile, chemical, auto and steel industries combined.

GATT has proved effective in bringing about reductions in the use of quantitative restrictions (administrative limits on the amount of a commodity which a nation will import each year), which have particularly hampered American exports. In recent months the United States has obtained notable reductions in these war-born restrictions. The current boom in soft coal exports, for example, which has done much to revive that industry, can be traced in part to removal of restrictions by Belgium and West Germany which our negotiators secured through GATT.

GATT has also proved remarkably useful in settling disputes over trade matters which in the past have done much to poison relations between otherwise friendly nations. In these various ways GATT has contributed directly to the strength of the free world in the mortal struggle with the Soviet bloc.

Membership in OTC is needed because it is important to the United States to make GATT stronger. The OTC will provide GATT with a much needed businesslike administration. This will make all the work of GATT more effective, whether it

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by Richard H. Anthony

This is a personal statement by the executive secretary of the American Tariff League, Inc.

THE core of the controversy over the Organization for Trade Co-operation is not really OTC but the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. OTC does not stand on its own feet; its only mission would be to serve GATT as an administrative, interpretive and enforcement arm.

The administration is currently using two new selling points to urge a reluctant Congress to endorse OTC. The argument runs that (1) OTC, when attached to GATT, will provide machinery to prevent the proposed European common market from engaging in practices that discriminate against us; and (2) the enabling bill, H.R. 6630, is so hemmed about with reservations as to render OTC harmless.

The two arguments, on their face, are inconsistent, because a weak OTC would hardly be a bulwark against possible undesirable trade practices of the European common market. However, neither argument, on its own, is valid.

If Europe does succeed in creating a common market it will be through a resolute determination to overcome the inertia and mutual antagonisms of centuries. If such an overpowering momentum develops, the resultant organization will not be easily thwarted from its course, discriminatory or not.

Furthermore, such a common market would be superior in authority to GATT plus OTC, at least for the nations composing it. The market proposal calls for a parliamentary body, an administrative arm and a court, all the appurtenances of a governing instrumentality that is sure to com-

mand the best talents from the participating nations. These men are unlikely to be curbed in their purposes by an organization such as a combined GATT and OTC, administered by a group of lesser functionaries. Also, the bloc of nations comprising the European common market and the auxiliary free-trade area would hold the balance of power, and probably constitute an actual majority, within GATT-OTC. In the plenary councils of the newly proposed GATT-OTC the United States would have but 1 vote out of 35 or more.

The seeming qualifications in H.R. 6630 to United States commitment to OTC are peripheral and do not go to the basic endorsement of the organization, which is clear and unequivocal. The first section of the bill authorizes the President "to accept membership for the United States" in OTC, without proviso or qualification.

All or Nothing

There is no provision in OTC for qualified acceptance by a member country. Its rules are so ordered that without the United States it cannot come into being. We must assume that the administration is seeking an unconditional endorsement of OTC because anything less would be a stumbling block to OTC's entry into force.

Hence, if H.R. 6630 were enacted, the United States would be committed fully to OTC and, through it, to GATT. If a majority of GATT countries wanted to enlarge its scope and operations, as some are constantly proposing, they could vote such a

change. GATT is self-amendatory; so is OTC. OTC cannot amend GATT, and possibly, vice versa. However, OTC and GATT members are the same countries. When they sit as contracting parties to GATT, they can amend GATT; when they sit as OTC members, they can amend OTC.

If the United States was outvoted, what could we do? We are not legally committed to abide by majority decisions; but there is every moral commitment, since the very existence of OTC would depend upon our continued membership in it. If we withdrew, OTC would fall apart. The world would thereupon accuse us of failure to abide by majority rule and of disrupting the comity of nations. We would pause long before incurring that stigma.

We cannot enter GATT-OTC with our fingers crossed. We must make the honorable decision now whether it is better to enter and run the risk of being forced into a position against our interests, or whether it is better not to go in at all.

What are the reasons why so many of us feel we should stay clear of any OTC commitment?

Those who oppose GATT-OTC believe that it is only another International Trade Organization. The ITO failed to win United States endorsement because it proposed a world-production and distribution planning-scheme inimical to our best interests. ITO is dead, but the idea survives.

GATT has lacked the round-the-clock organizational features of ITO. OTC would supply that deficiency. With OTC linked to GATT the ITO pattern could soon be fulfilled if a majority of member countries so willed.

Here is what the United States stands to lose by lending its support to GATT-OTC:

1. The United States has a policy of regulating its imports by tariffs and other means, to safeguard domestic agriculture, mining and manufacturing and the wage standards and jobs of workers therein. This policy is already in conflict with GATT. OTC would pledge us to a continuous process of bargaining away our tariffs and to end our quotas. At the same time, GATT's exceptions to its rules would permit other countries to maintain their restrictions against us.

2. GATT-OTC would commit us to work to change our laws and administrative procedures so as to conform to those adopted by a majority of nations with economic and political concepts far different from ours. Those concepts are summed up in GATT objectives that would permit reforming the world into productive zones and making individual countries less self-reliant and more interdependent. Whether or not such an ideal is sound even under favorable conditions of lasting peace, any move toward such a scheme now would serve to weaken the United States at a time when our full strength is needed as a bulwark of the free world.

3. GATT sets up artificial rules and machinery whereby other nations can and do accuse us of failure to foster world trade and the economies of other countries, despite our record of postwar economic and military aid abroad. OTC would provide additional means for stirring up retaliatory actions against us whenever we acted in our own interest but contrary to GATT obligations.

GATT, with or without OTC, is not an effective approach to today's international problems. It was designed as a temporary expedient until ITO could come into being, at a time (1947) when there was some hope that the free and Communist areas could work together harmoniously. To induce such harmony,

GATT's objectives and rules were written as an umbrella to cover divergent economic and political concepts.

Today's world is, of course, split into two camps. The free world is more and more resorting to regional approaches to solve its problems. In this changing scene GATT is an anachronism.

Rather than trying to patch and putter with GATT, we ought to face up to the times, scrap it and start afresh. We need a more fluid approach, not a rigid code of conduct with more exceptions than rules.

We certainly ought to try to harmonize our trade policies with those of friendly countries. We undoubtedly could work out a series of agreements. But instead of incorporating them in one comprehensive framework, they should take the form of *ad hoc* treaties, to be presented to member countries for action according to their parliamentary procedures.

Truer real progress would be made by this method than by the irritant one of creating an OTC for the purpose of needling member countries to abide by the hodgepodge rules of GATT.

Cortney

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is reducing discrimination against dollar exports, resolving trade disputes among members, or providing a forum for nations to negotiate for mutually beneficial lower tariffs.

The strides now being made to create a vast integrated economy in Western Europe make American membership in the OTC urgent. The European common market and associated free-trade area which are now taking shape will be a new major power. The nations involved have a combined output equal to over half that of the United States and a skilled population half again larger than ours. In 1956 these European nations

bought over \$4 billion worth of United States exports.

In increasing numbers American businessmen returning from Europe say that unless GATT is strengthened by establishing the OTC, the integration plans in Europe will turn into a discriminatory device against the outside world. Should this happen, the United States and all other friendly nations outside of Europe will suffer.

GATT provides for the possibility of developments such as the European common market. Nations belonging to GATT can form this type of customs union provided their main purpose is not to discriminate against third countries. If GATT is a strong, effective body, these provisions to guard against injury can be made to stick. On the other hand, if there is doubt about American support for GATT, the nations in Western Europe may only give lip service to their obligations in GATT.

The other nations which adhere to GATT consider United States action on OTC as the crucial test of the strength of our support for GATT. If America does not join the OTC, those individuals in other nations who would like to see international trade carried on in comfortable regional markets, freed from American competition, will be strengthened. The Soviet bloc will be the main beneficiary should this occur. Recognizing this, the Soviet bloc has worked actively to frustrate the OTC and weaken GATT.

By joining the OTC the United States will demonstrate that it is firmly committed to the principles of GATT and to the system of international cooperation for reducing governmental interference with international trade. In short, support for the OTC and GATT amounts to a reaffirmation in the international economic field of American leadership for a strong free world.



Japan and Far East Security

TOKYO—The announcement in Washington on June 21 that the United States would substantially reduce the number of its security forces in Japan within the next year and promptly withdraw all its ground combat troops brought Japan a feeling of satisfaction mingled with concern about a new series of decisions which must be made as a result.

For the Japanese the definite prospect of the withdrawal of American ground combat forces is a welcome symbol of their national independence, which they feel had not been fully restored at the end of the occupation. This symbol is important not only for domestic consumption but also in terms of Japan's prestige among the Asian nations, which have tended to regard Tokyo as subject to the military influence of the United States. Tokyo's ultimate objective is renegotiation of its security treaty with Washington in the form of a bilateral agreement between equals—not between victor and vanquished.

Secure from What?

The Japanese, however, are realists. They know that the reduction of American troops means difficult decisions about the character and size of the defense force they are willing to maintain in the future out of their own resources.

On the eve of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's departure for Washington, *The Mainichi* stated that the government was planning to have a ground force of 180,000 men, a naval strength of 124,000 tons and an air force of 1,300 planes—at the cost of 2 percent of the national income. It expressed doubts that the United States would be satisfied with the proposed Japanese ground force,

yet reported skepticism in financial circles as to whether Japan could afford to spend 2 percent of its national income on defense. Like the Germans, the Japanese, having learned the painful consequences of militarism, are determined to concentrate their resources on production for export, not for armament.

Critics of the Kishi government, however, fear that it will try to make up for limitations of military manpower and money by accepting American nuclear weapons—and the mere mention of the term *nuclear* provokes automatic resistance on the part of the Japanese, still unreconciled to Hiroshima.

The fundamental question as the Japanese see it, when the problem of their security arises, is, Security from what? No modern nation, they argue—not even the two superpowers, the United States and the U.S.S.R.—can afford to arm in such a way as to assure itself against all possible contingencies. If Japan is to seek full "security" in the Far East, it might have to impose an intolerable drain on its limited industrial and financial resources—only to discover in an emergency that it had sacrificed economic prosperity for inadequate defenses. Moreover, the Socialists, principal opponents of the ruling Liberal-Democrats, fear that emphasis on military preparedness would open the way for return to the pre-1941 way of life which the American occupation successfully altered. Remilitarization, they say, bodes ill for liberalism.

To Americans who point out the danger of Communist China's expansion, the Japanese give a hard-boiled answer. They do not believe that China went Communist because

it was "sold down the river" by a handful of Americans—Acheson, Marshall, Truman, and a few United States China experts. Communism, they contend, resulted from conditions over which the United States had no control; and in their opinion these conditions were aggravated by the actions of the Japanese militarists in the 1930's.

Japan's View of China

By the same token they are not afraid of Peiping. As they see it, the Communists will have their hands full carrying out their overambitious industrialization program and in any case would hardly want to add to their problems by attacking raw-material-hungry Japan. Nor would they feel any compunction if the United States recognized Communist China. Their own recognition of the Nationalist government, they declare, was a matter solely of expediency. And after an initial period of placating Washington on China trade, the Japanese are ready to follow Britain's lead, even if they expect no spectacular results.

Given this diagnosis of the principal source of potential danger to Japan's security, some Japanese—notably the Socialists—wonder whether Japan should remain closely linked to the United States or, instead, steer an independent course in world affairs. What the Socialists have in mind, as explained by Eki Sone, a former career diplomat now chief of the party's Planning Bureau, is a Far Eastern Locarno, under which the United States, the U.S.S.R., Communist China and Japan, breaking away from the present two-bloc alignment, would guarantee each other against aggression by any one

of the four. This would not mean rejection of modest national-defense measures or that Japan would enter SEATO. Rather, the Socialists look toward the development of a regional security program, preferably within the framework of the UN.

As to the basic threat to Japan's

security—the possibility that it might go Communist—the Japanese, whether conservatives or Socialists, also have a hard-boiled answer. Communism, they are convinced, will not be imposed on Japan from the outside, by either Russia or China. If it comes, it will result from internal political,

economic and social conditions. These conditions can be improved, not by military security measures, but only by continuance of high-level productivity through access to raw materials and markets.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of two articles on Japan.)



FPA Bookshelf

Village in the Vaucluse, by Laurence Wylie. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957. \$5.50.

An intimate account of life in a small French town, where the author, a professor of Haverford College, and his family lived for a year. His understanding of French behavior at this grass-roots level helps particularly to explain what appear to be the puzzling complexities of French politics when viewed from a distance. It is a delightful and thoroughly objective book.

The Taxis of the Marne, by Jean Dutoit. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1957. \$3.50.

What happened to France between 1914, when it taxied its reinforcements to the Marne, and 1940, when there was little resistance to the Germans? The author, an editor in a French publishing house who fought in the Resistance, tries to answer this question in a somewhat abstract and generalized way.

The Anatomy of South African Misery, by C. W. de Kiewiet. New York, Oxford University Press, 1957. \$1.75.

An exceptionally perceptive and balanced analysis of the problems created by South Africa's policy of *apartheid*. Dr. de Kiewiet, president of the University of Rochester and distinguished historian, was educated

in South Africa. This book consists of three lectures delivered at McMaster University in Canada.

Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, by Howard K. Beale. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. \$6.00.

A brilliant, endlessly fascinating, richly documented, study of Theodore Roosevelt's role in shaping American foreign policy. The chapter on policy toward China at the turn of the century should be read by all who are wondering today about this country's future course in Asia.

John Foster Dulles: A Biography, by John R. Beal. New York, Harper, 1957. \$4.50.

This is the much discussed book by the Washington correspondent of *Time* magazine. The material on the Suez Canal crisis is particularly worth attention. Mr. Beal contends that Mr. Dulles' policy is coherent and purposeful, but leaves many controversial questions unanswered. The chapters on the Secretary's early years will be of special interest to the general reader.

An Introduction to International Law, by Wesley L. Gould. New York, Harper, 1957. \$7.50.

A textbook prepared primarily for students in history, government, political sci-

ence and allied fields. The author, a professor at Purdue University, states that his object was to present not "merely a collection of rules" but "the vital relationship between the law and international activities of various sorts."

The Relations of Nations, by Frederick H. Hartmann. New York, Macmillan, 1957. \$6.25.

An interpretive account of international relations, by a professor of political science at the University of Florida. In his foreword the author states that he has presented in this textbook "a distinct theory of international relations" in order to help meet the needs of Americans for a "fundamental and integrated knowledge of the relations of nations" and "a comprehensive understanding of the state system, built upon a sufficient knowledge of history." The general reader, as well as the student, will find this book both interesting and informative.

Cry of the Heart, by Hertha Pauli. New York, Ives Washburn, 1957. \$3.50.

A biography of Bertha von Suttner, who persuaded Alfred Nobel to found his prize for peace and was the first woman to win it. The author interestingly presents the work and personal life of a charming yet forceful woman who was one of the earliest crusaders for peace in modern times.

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